• 6 Posts
  • 564 Comments
Joined 3 years ago
cake
Cake day: June 13th, 2023

help-circle












  • The value of institutional knowledge is almost impossible to quantify and organizations are often totally inept at assessing the risks that come with losing it. Even if the risks are properly assessed and understood, the cost of mitigating them is immediate for a potential return on investment which is unknown.

    I know from personal experience that getting an organization to mitigate these types of risks is usually an up hill battle. Even when the organization can easily afford it.

    It’s easier to stick their heads in the sand and it goes way beyond just “white color” professionals. If you own a manufacturing plant, you could potentially lose a machinists annual salary, or more, in one hour of downtime. But I’ve seen at least a few large operations where the tool and die shop consists of one very overworked machinist. Management’s attitude is “oh, well we’ll just hire his replacement off the street whenever he finally decides to retire.”

    The only problem with that is that the current guy has been there for 20 years, knows where ALL the bodies are buried, and has the skills to bring the plant back online with a welder and some scrap metal.

    Even if the next person is really good at their job and magically shows up at the front door, it’s going to take them a while to get up to speed. That “while” costs money. In fact, it costs a lot of money. But there’s no way to reflect that on an income statement so nobody does anything about it.







  • When I was a kid, my first real job was at a well known big box store. One time a customer stops me and asks where something is in a department that I’m not familiar with. Back then there were no handheld computers for easily searching inventory.

    Customer becomes angry when I can’t find what he’s looking for so I call the assistant store manager on duty for help. Manager comes over and the customer proceeds to tell him just exactly how stupid he thinks I am.

    The manager – whom I will call “J” – was a miserable, gruff, chain smoking SOB who is like 6 months from the end of his 36 year career. But he stops the customer mid-tirade and says, “Now wait just a minute. We’re happy to help you find what you need but JubilationTCornpone is a fine young man and one of our best associates and I am not going to stand here and listen to you talk about him like that.”

    The customer leaves in a huff. “J” looks at me and says, “Just because the ‘customer is always right’ doesn’t mean they get to treat you like shit. He can go to hell. We don’t need his money.”

    I never really liked “J” because he was a pain in the ass but he earned my respect for that.


  • On December 15, 1953, led by Paul Hahn, the head of American Tobacco, the six major tobacco companies (American Tobacco Co., R. J. Reynolds, Philip Morris, Benson & Hedges, U.S. Tobacco Co., and Brown & Williamson) met with public relations company Hill & Knowlton in New York City to create an advertisement that would assuage the public’s fears and create a false sense of security in order to regain the public’s confidence in the tobacco industry.[12] Hill and Knowlton’s president, John W. Hill, realized that simply denying the health risks would not be enough to convince the public. Instead, a more effective method would be to create a major scientific controversy in which the scientifically established link between smoking tobacco and lung cancer would appear not to be conclusively known.[13]

    The tobacco companies fought against the emerging science by producing their own science, which suggested that existing science was incomplete and that the industry was not motivated by self-interest.[11] With the creation of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee, headed by accomplished scientist C.C. Little, the tobacco companies manufactured doubt and turned scientific findings into a topic of debate. The recruitment of credentialed scientists like Little who were skeptics was a crucial aspect of the tobacco companies’ social engineering plan to establish credibility against anti-smoking reports. By amplifying the voices of a few skeptical scientists, the industry created an illusion that the larger scientific community had not reached a conclusive agreement on the link between smoking and cancer.[11]

    Internal documents released through whistleblowers and litigation, such as the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, reveal that while advertisements like A Frank Statement made tobacco companies appear to be responsible and concerned for the health of their consumers, in reality, they were deceiving the public into believing that smoking did not have health risks. The whole project was aimed at protecting the tobacco companies’ images of glamour and all-American individualism at the cost of the public’s health.[14]

    A Frank Statement